{"id":"hexagon/2610.00556","pdf":"https://hexagonmath.org/pdf/2610.00556v1","url":"https://hexagonmath.org/abs/2610.00556v1","tags":["msc:91B41","msc:90C25","approximate best responses","convex duality","risk aversion","robust contracts","sufficient statistics","unknown actions"],"score":0,"title":"Risk Aversion and Information in Robust Contracting","domain":"math.OC","source":"hexagon","authors":["Ruixue Yuan","Zhenyu Sun"],"reviews":0,"subject":"math.OC","summary":"We study hidden-action contracting with a risk-averse agent and partial knowledge of actions in a compact convex envelope of distribution--cost pairs. With finitely many outcomes and bounded deterministic wages, the principal's worst-case payoff admits an exact dual representation with an endogenous $f$-divergence governed by transfer utility and an incentive multiplier. Under strictly concave utility, finite-multiplier branch optima follow a truncated likelihood-ratio rule, including at zero-probability outcomes. To address nonattainment induced by adversarial tie-breaking, we characterize…","category":"research","comments":0,"disputed":false,"division":"math","mentions":0,"ai_models":["ChatGPT"],"discussed":0,"published":"2026-10-26","reactions":{},"withdrawn":false,"authorship":"human","formalized":false,"human_understanding":"all"}