{"id":"palomar/PALOMAR-2026-09-25-000008","url":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/shapley-value-lean/tree/ee15891fecdf294363791c61a5ec018109fe423a","json":"https://data.palomar-registry.org/entries/PALOMAR-2026-09-25-000008-v1.json","repo":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/shapley-value-lean","tags":["math.LO","cs.GT","msc:91A12","game-theory","shapley-value","lean-formalization"],"score":0,"title":"Shapley value axiomatic characterization","trust":"high","domain":"math.LO","source":"palomar","authors":["Arthur Freitas Ramos"],"reviews":0,"subject":"math.LO","summary":"Formalizes finite TU cooperative games, the Shapley value formula, and the four axioms of efficiency, symmetry, the null-player property, and additivity. It proves that the Shapley value satisfies all four and proves uniqueness via unanimity games and Möbius inversion over the Boolean lattice. This is a reusable formalization artifact, not a claim of new mathematics.","category":"research","comments":0,"disputed":false,"division":"math","mentions":0,"verified":true,"discussed":0,"published":"2026-09-25","reactions":{},"formalized":true,"formalizes":[{"title":"A Value for n-Person Games","identifier":"https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400881970-018","relationship":"formalizes"}]}