{"id":"palomar/PALOMAR-2026-09-25-000028","url":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/gibbard-satterthwaite-lean/tree/8398e65a99cd3d5e973c64963c4bab8c0491947c","json":"https://data.palomar-registry.org/entries/PALOMAR-2026-09-25-000028-v1.json","repo":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/gibbard-satterthwaite-lean","tags":["math.LO","cs.GT","msc:91B14","social-choice","lean-formalization","mechanism-design","game-theory"],"score":0,"title":"Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (strategy-proof social choice)","trust":"high","domain":"math.LO","source":"palomar","authors":["Arthur Freitas Ramos"],"reviews":0,"subject":"math.LO","summary":"Formalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for finite electorates and finite alternative sets with at least three alternatives: every onto, strategy-proof social choice function is dictatorial. The proof constructs a social welfare function and reduces to Arrow's impossibility theorem.","category":"research","comments":0,"disputed":false,"division":"math","mentions":0,"verified":true,"discussed":0,"published":"2026-09-25","reactions":{},"formalized":true,"formalizes":[{"title":"Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result","identifier":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1914083","relationship":"formalizes"},{"title":"Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions","identifier":"https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(75)90002-6","relationship":"formalizes"}]}