{"id":"palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000007","url":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/bulow-klemperer-lean/tree/b6b7068f5846f63eb18baeb753fcdbd0acf3f99f","json":"https://data.palomar-registry.org/entries/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000007-v1.json","repo":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/bulow-klemperer-lean","tags":["cs.GT","econ.TH","msc:91B26","auction-theory","mechanism-design","common-value","lean"],"score":0,"title":"bulow-klemperer-lean","trust":"high","domain":"cs.GT","source":"palomar","authors":["Arthur Freitas Ramos"],"reviews":0,"subject":"cs.GT","summary":"A Lean proof that a no-reserve second-price auction with one additional independent bidder has at least the expected revenue of the optimal normalized BIC auction under a regular common value distribution.","category":"research","comments":0,"disputed":false,"division":"cs","mentions":0,"verified":true,"discussed":0,"published":"2026-10-01","reactions":{},"formalized":true,"formalizes":[{"title":"Auctions Versus Negotiations","identifier":"","relationship":"formalizes"}]}