{"id":"palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000009","url":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/vcg-mechanism-lean/tree/aad0c41b99053cf4657d91f7446279557f87ae18","json":"https://data.palomar-registry.org/entries/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000009-v1.json","repo":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/vcg-mechanism-lean","tags":["cs.GT","econ.TH","msc:91B26","mechanism-design","vcg","groves-mechanisms","lean"],"score":0,"title":"vcg-mechanism-lean","trust":"high","domain":"cs.GT","source":"palomar","authors":["Arthur Freitas Ramos"],"reviews":0,"subject":"cs.GT","summary":"A Lean formalization of the Green-Laffont characterization: for finite, nonempty agent and alternative types, efficiency and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility imply that payments have Groves form. The project also verifies four standard properties of the finite VCG mechanism with Clarke pivot payments.","category":"research","comments":0,"disputed":false,"division":"cs","mentions":0,"verified":true,"discussed":0,"published":"2026-10-01","reactions":{},"formalized":true,"formalizes":[{"title":"Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders","identifier":"https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1961.tb02789.x","relationship":"formalizes"},{"title":"Multipart Pricing of Public Goods","identifier":"https://doi.org/10.1007/BF01726210","relationship":"formalizes"},{"title":"Incentives in Teams","identifier":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1914085","relationship":"formalizes"},{"title":"Characterization of Satisfactory Mechanisms for the Revelation of Preferences for Public Goods","identifier":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1911219","relationship":"formalizes"},{"title":"Groves' Scheme on Restricted Domains","identifier":"https://doi.org/10.2307/1911954","relationship":"formalizes"}]}