{"id":"palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000019","url":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/border-auction-feasibility-lean/tree/690e62ec02d68f1e993fd53e46963d79b7993a2b","json":"https://data.palomar-registry.org/entries/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000019-v1.json","repo":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/border-auction-feasibility-lean","tags":["econ.TH","cs.GT","msc:91B26","msc:90C05","msc:03B35","auction-theory","mechanism-design","game-theory","economics"],"score":0,"title":"Border's Finite Auction Feasibility Theorem","trust":"high","domain":"econ.TH","source":"palomar","authors":["Arthur Freitas Ramos","David Barros Hulak","Ruy Jose Guerra Barretto de Queiroz"],"reviews":0,"subject":"econ.TH","summary":"For arbitrary finite bidders with heterogeneous finite type spaces, a nonnegative normalized real joint prior, and an interim allocation rule with values in [0,1], a randomized allocation of at most one item realizes the weighted interim masses if and only if every collection of bidder-specific type subsets satisfies Border's union-probability inequality. Weighted feasibility is proved equivalent to conditional feasibility on positive marginal support. Null-type interim values remain unrestricted within [0,1]. For a product of nonnegative normalized distributions, the independent-prior…","category":"research","comments":0,"disputed":false,"division":"econ","mentions":0,"verified":true,"discussed":0,"published":"2026-10-01","reactions":{},"formalized":true,"formalizes":[{"title":"Reduced Form Auctions Revisited","identifier":"","relationship":"formalizes"}]}