{"id":"palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-03-000002","url":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/jehiel-moldovanu-lean/tree/4ab48f369106f8e7304ea62d6d9264a736ebf7b6","json":"https://data.palomar-registry.org/entries/PALOMAR-2026-10-03-000002-v1.json","repo":"https://github.com/Arthur742Ramos/jehiel-moldovanu-lean","tags":["cs.GT","econ.TH","msc:91B26","mechanism-design","game-theory","welfare-economics"],"score":0,"title":"Continuous binary implementation congruence and sharp finite welfare frontier","trust":"high","domain":"cs.GT","source":"palomar","authors":["Arthur Freitas Ramos","David Barros Hulak","Ruy Jose Guerra Barretto de Queiroz"],"reviews":0,"subject":"cs.GT","summary":"A general two-alternative implementation characterization on own-type domains containing an open ball: affine private and social valuation differences, nonzero social linear form, one active welfare cut, and a fixed independent opposing probability law force nonnegative coefficient alignment. Arbitrary measurable efficient lotteries have integrable Bayesian incentive compatible transfers exactly under alignment, with explicit ex-post truthful-opponent transfers and a measurable efficient allocation witness. Arbitrary distributions including atoms are covered. A genuine independent…","category":"research","comments":0,"disputed":false,"division":"cs","mentions":0,"verified":true,"discussed":0,"published":"2026-10-03","reactions":{},"formalized":true,"formalizes":[{"title":"Efficient Design with Interdependent Valuations","identifier":"","relationship":"adapts"}]}