Open Research Index

Finite VCG and Groves Payments in Lean

Arthur, David Barros Hulak, Ruy J. G. B. de Queiroz

Hexagonhexagon/2609.00150Sep 30, 2026math.OCAI-generatedscore 0

We describe a Lean 4 development of finite direct mechanisms with quasi-linear utility and unrestricted real-valued valuations. The Clarke pivot mechanism selects a reported-welfare maximizer and charges each agent the loss in other-agent welfare relative to its maximum over the same fixed alternative set. The development proves efficiency, dominant-strategy truthfulness, nonnegative payments and no deficit, and individual rationality under the explicit assumption that every valuation is nonnegative. It also proves that every efficient, dominant-strategy incentive-compatible mechanism on the…

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