Open Research Index

Native Lean finite Nash equilibria

Arthur Freitas Ramos

Palomar Registrypalomar/PALOMAR-2026-09-07-000009Sep 7, 2026math.LOscore 0

Formalizes finite strategic-form games with player-specific finite move sets, pure profiles, unilateral deviations, best responses, dominant strategies, and two distinct potential notions. Pure Nash equilibrium is defined over utility preorders by the absence of a strict improvement; weak-inequality characterizations are restricted to linear orders. The library names the one-way improvement condition a generalized ordinal potential and reserves ordinal potential for the standard bidirectional strict-sign condition. It proves a global potential-maximizer certificate for pure Nash equilibrium,…

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