Open Research Index

Finite correlated equilibria and regret certificates

Arthur Freitas Ramos, David Barros Hulak, Ruy Jose Guerra Barretto de Queiroz

Palomar Registrypalomar/PALOMAR-2026-09-08-000001Sep 8, 2026cs.GTscore 0

For finite games with player-specific action types, a valid independent product distribution is a correlated equilibrium exactly when its mixed profile is Nash. The correlated-equilibrium set is nonempty, compact, and convex when every player's action type is nonempty. For every positive finite horizon, cumulative external-regret and swap-regret bounds give corresponding approximate coarse-correlated and correlated equilibria of the empirical distribution. The development also proves equivalence with conditional obedience inequalities, arbitrary mixed-deviation sufficiency, and…

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