Open Research Index

roberts-theorem-lean

Arthur Freitas Ramos

Palomar Registrypalomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000008Oct 1, 2026cs.GTscore 0

A Lean formalization of Roberts theorem: for finite nonempty agent and alternative types with at least three alternatives, every onto dominant-strategy incentive compatible choice function is an affine maximizer. The proof follows the modular route: the taxation principle and weak monotonicity, reduction to strong monotonicity by tie-breaking, no-veto-power range analysis, the two-agent affine price representation, and induction on the number of agents.

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