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Shapley value axiomatic characterization

Arthur Freitas Ramos

Palomar Registrypalomar/PALOMAR-2026-09-25-000008Sep 25, 2026math.LOscore 0

Formalizes finite TU cooperative games, the Shapley value formula, and the four axioms of efficiency, symmetry, the null-player property, and additivity. It proves that the Shapley value satisfies all four and proves uniqueness via unanimity games and Möbius inversion over the Boolean lattice. This is a reusable formalization artifact, not a claim of new mathematics.

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