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Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem (strategy-proof social choice)

Arthur Freitas Ramos

Palomar Registrypalomar/PALOMAR-2026-09-25-000028Sep 25, 2026math.LOscore 0

Formalizes the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem for finite electorates and finite alternative sets with at least three alternatives: every onto, strategy-proof social choice function is dictatorial. The proof constructs a social welfare function and reduces to Arrow's impossibility theorem.

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