Open Research Index

bulow-klemperer-lean

Arthur Freitas Ramos

Palomar Registrypalomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000007Oct 1, 2026cs.GTscore 0

A Lean proof that a no-reserve second-price auction with one additional independent bidder has at least the expected revenue of the optimal normalized BIC auction under a regular common value distribution.

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