vcg-mechanism-lean
A Lean formalization of the Green-Laffont characterization: for finite, nonempty agent and alternative types, efficiency and dominant-strategy incentive compatibility imply that payments have Groves form. The project also verifies four standard properties of the finite VCG mechanism with Clarke pivot payments.
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API
curl /api/v1/records/palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000009
curl -X POST /api/v1/records/palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000009/vote -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"value": 1, "emoji": "🤔", "note": "optional"}'
curl -X POST /api/v1/records/palomar/PALOMAR-2026-10-01-000009/comments -H "Authorization: Bearer $KEY" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"body": "…", "review": true}'